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Abstract
The relationship between collapsibility and confounding has been subject to an
extensive and ongoing discussion in the methodological literature. We discuss two
subtly different definitions of collapsibility, and show that by considering causal
measures of effect based on counterfactual variables it is possible to separate out
the component of non-collapsibility which is due to the mathematical properties of
the effect measure, from the components that are due to structural bias such as
confounding. We provide weights such that the causal risk difference and the causal
risk ratio are collapsible over arbitrary baseline covariates, and demonstrate that
such general weights do not exist for the odds ratio.
1. INTRODUCTION
A measure of association (such as the risk difference or the risk ratio) is said to be
collapsible if the marginal measure of association is equal to a weighted average of the
stratum-specific measures of association [1]. The relationship between collapsibility and
confounding has been subject to an extensive and ongoing discussion in the literature[2].
In this paper, we argue that the concept of collapsibility can be made clearer by framing
the discussion in terms of causal effect measures based on counterfactual variables.
In all the examples, we are interested in the effect of a binary exposure A (e.g. a drug),
on a binary outcome Y (e.g. a side effect). We use superscript to denote counterfactual
variables [3]. For example, Y a=1 is an indicator for whether an individual would have got
the outcome if, possibly contrary to fact, she had been exposed to the drug. We will make
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a distinction between measures of association, which compare the distribution of the out-
comes in the exposed with the distribution of outcomes in the unexposed; and causal mea-
sures of effect, which compare the counterfactual distribution under exposure (across ev-
eryone) with the counterfactual distribution under the absence of exposure (across every-
one). For example, the associational risk difference is Pr(Y = 1|A = 1)−Pr(Y = 1|A = 0)
whereas the causal risk difference (RD) is Pr(Y a=1 = 1) − Pr(Y a=0 = 1). These effect
measures may be defined within levels of covariates V . We denote this using a subscript
on the effect measure: RDv = Pr(Y
a=1 = 1|V = v)− Pr(Y a=0 = 1|V = v).
2. DEFINITIONS OF COLLAPSIBILITY
We will adopt Pearl’s definition of collapsibility for measures of association [4]:
Definition 1. (Collapsibility of a Measure of Association) Let g[f(A, Y )] be any func-
tional that measures the association between A and Y in the joint distribution f(A, Y ).
We say that g is collapsible on a variable V with weights wv if
∑
v
{g[f(A,Y |V =v)]×wv}∑
v
wv
=
g[f(A, Y )]
Newman [5] showed conditions under which the associational risk difference, risk ratio,
and odds ratio are collapsible according to this definition. He also provided correspond-
ing weights. Briefly, we note that: the associational risk difference is collapsible with
weights Pr(V = v|A = 1) if V is not associated with the outcome in the unexposed,
or if V is not associated with the exposure; the associational risk ratio is collapsible
with weights Pr(V = v|A = 1) × Pr(Y = 1|A = 0, V = v) under similar conditions;
and the associational odds ratio is collapsible with weights Pr(V = v|A = 1) × Pr(Y =
0|A = 1, V = v) × Pr(Y =1|A=0,V =v)
1−Pr(Y =1|A=0,V =v)
under certain very limiting conditions, for example
if Pr(Y = 1|A = 0, V = v) is equal for all values of v. A full discussion of the graphical
and probabilistic conditions that lead to collapsibility under this definition is provided by
Greenland and Pearl [6].
From these results, it follows that general statements about the collapsibility properties
of effect measures (e.g. “the risk difference is collapsible”) must either be qualified by the
specification of the conditions that are being assumed, or alternatively taken to refer to
some other definition of collapsibility. We propose a suitable definition: a causal measure
of effect is collapsible if the marginal effect measure is equal to a weighted average of the
stratum-specific causal effect measures. This is a formalization of the definition used in
Fine Point 4.3 in Hernan and Robins textbook Causal Inference:
Definition 2. (Collapsibility of a Measure of Causal Effect)
Let h[f(Y a=0, Y a=1)] be any functional that measures the association between Y a=0
and Y a=1 in the joint distribution f(Y a=0, Y a=1). We say that h is collapsible on a variable
V with weights wv if
∑
v
{{h[f(Y a=0,Y a=1|V =v)]×wv}∑
v
wv
= h[f(Y a=0, Y a=1)]
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Under definition 2, collapsibility is understood as a mathematical property of the effect
measure, rather than a consequence of certain graphical or probabilistic structures in the
data set. Consequently, results from Greenland and Pearl do not apply under definition
2, and measures of effect may be collapsible over V even if V is a confounder. Definitions
1 and 2 are not generally equivalent: a set of weights that satisfies definition 1 may
not satisfy definition 2, and conversely a set of weights that satisfies definition 2 may not
satisfy definition 1. The definitions are however equivalent if there is both no confounding
conditional on V, and no confounding unconditionally (i.e. if Y a ⊥ A and Y a ⊥ A|V for
all values of a).
Finally, we consider a third related concept, discussed by Miettinen [7], who stated
(correctly, but without proof) that the “standardized risk ratio” (SRR), which is con-
structed by standardizing the risk in the exposed and the risk in the unexposed separately
with weights Pr(V = v) and reporting the ratio of these measures (Formula 4 in Mietti-
nen), is equal to a weighted average of the stratum-specific risk ratios under the weights
Pr(V = v)×Pr(Y = 1|A = 0, V = v). (Formula 6 in Miettinen). Since Miettinen’s SRR is
equal to the causal risk ratio if there is no unmeasured confounding, Miettinen’s weights
satisfy Definition 2 in the special case of no confounding conditional on V .
3. COLLAPSIBILITY OF MEASURES OF CAUSAL EFFECT
3.1 Risk difference
The causal risk difference is collapsible over covariates V with respect to weights wv if∑
v
{[Pr(Y a=1=1|V =v)−Pr(Y a=0=1|V =v)]×wv}∑
v
wv
= Pr(Y a=1 = 1)− Pr(Y a=0 = 1). We next proceed
to show that the causal risk difference is collapsible over arbitrary covariates V if we use
the weights wv = Pr(V = v).
First note that the sum of the weights is 1, allowing the denominator to be ignored.
Next,
∑
v
[Pr(Y a=1 = 1|V = v)− Pr(Y a=0 = 1|V = v)]× Pr(V = v)
=
∑
v
Pr(Y a=1 = 1|V = v)× Pr(V = v)−
∑
v
Pr(Y a=0 = 1|V = v)× Pr(V = v)
= Pr(Y a=1 = 1)− Pr(Y a=0 = 1)
(1)
Also note that if the risk difference is the same in every stratum (i.e. in the absence of
effect modification) the stratum-specific risk differences will also be equal to the marginal
risk difference, and the risk difference is collapsible with any weights. It can be shown
that this is true for any measure of effect for which there exist weights that guarantee
collapsibility over arbitrary covariates.
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3.2 Risk Ratio
The risk ratio is asymmetric with respect to coding of the outcome, so it is necessary to
consider each risk ratio model separately. These are defined as follows:
RR(−) = Pr(Y
a=1=1)
Pr(Y a=0=1)
RR(+) = Pr(Y
a=1=0)
Pr(Y a=0=0)
The two risk ratio models require different sets of weights for collapsibility. We next
show that the causal risk ratio RR(−) is collapsible over arbitrary covariates V if we use
the weights wv = Pr(V = v|Y
a=0 = 1), i.e. weights determined by the distribution of the
baseline covariates among those individuals who would have been cases if they, possibly
contrary to fact, were not treated with drug A:
Our goal is to show that
Pr(Y a=1 = 1)
Pr(Y a=0 = 1)
=
∑
v [
Pr(Y a=1=1|V =v)
Pr(Y a=0=1|V =v)
× Pr(V = v|(Y a=0 = 1)]
∑
v Pr(V = v|Y a=0 = 1)
Again, we note that the sum of the weights is 1, and that the denominator can therefore
be ignored.
∑
v
Pr(Y a=1 = 1|V = v)× Pr(V = v|Y a=0 = 1)
Pr(Y a=0 = 1|V = v)
=
∑
v
Pr(Y a=1 = 1|V = v)× Pr(Y a=0 = 1|V = v)× Pr(V = v)
Pr(Y a=0 = 1|V = v)× Pr(Y a=0 = 1)
(Bayes Theorem)
=
∑
v
Pr(Y a=1 = 1|V = v)× Pr(V = v)
Pr(Y a=0 = 1)
=
∑
v Pr(Y
a=1 = 1|V = v)× Pr(V = v)
Pr(Y a=0 = 1)
=
Pr(Y a=1 = 1)
Pr(Y a=0 = 1)
(2)
This proof is not invariant to the coding of the exposure or outcome variables, and the
correct weights will therefore depend on the exact specification of the risk ratio parameter.
Analogous proofs can be provided to show that the weights for RR(+) are given by
Pr(V = v|Y a=0 = 0), the weights for 1
RR(−)
are given by Pr(V = v|Y a=1 = 1), and that
the weights for 1
RR(+)
are given by Pr(V = v|Y a=1 = 0),
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Table 1: Conditional and Marginal Odds Ratios
Average Coun-
terfactual Risk
of Outcome
(Placebo)
Average Counter-
factual Risk of
Outcome (Treat-
ment)
Odds Ratio
Men (25 Percent) 0.5 0.75 3
Women (75 Percent) 0.25 0.5 3
Overall 0.3125 0.5625 2.82
Note that the marginal causal risk ratio is generally not equal to a weighted average
of the conditional causal risk ratios, if the weights are determined by the marginal distri-
bution of the covariates V . Exceptions occur in special situations, such as when the risk
ratio is equal in every stratum (i.e. when there is no effect modification on the risk ratio
scale).
3.3 Odds Ratio
For all the previously discussed parameters, we have shown that for any baseline covariates
V, there exist weights such that the marginal effect measure is equal to a weighted average
of the stratum-specific effects. We will now show that this does not hold for the odds
ratio by considering the following simple counterexample:
Consider a population, with 25 percent men and 75 percent women, where a random-
ized trial is conducted on the effect of drug A. The hypothetical results are shown in Table
1. The randomization probability is equal in men and women and we have an infinite
sample size, there is therefore no confounding.
This table shows that for the variable sex, the stratum-specific causal odds ratios
are equal between men and women, but the overall causal odds ratio is different from
the stratum-specific odds ratios. Moreover, since any weighted average of the stratum-
specific odds ratios is 3, there does not exist any set of weights that makes the odds ratio
collapsible over sex. This counterexample shows that no generally applicable weights such
as those for the risk difference and the risk ratio can be provided for the odds ratio.
4. IDENTIFICATION OF THE WEIGHTS
If the investigator intends to report an average of the stratum-specific effects as an estimate
of the marginal effect, it is necessary to know not only that the effect is collapsible in
principle, but also to construct appropriate weights, identify them from the data and
apply them in the analysis. The weights for the risk ratio RR(−), Pr(V = v|Y a=0 = 1),
have a counterfactual variable in the conditioning event, and may not be identified from
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the data. However, we proceed to show that the weights are identified in the absence of
unmeasured confounding, i.e if Y a=0 ⊥ A|V
Proof.
Pr(V = v|Y a=0 = 1)
=
Pr(Y a=0 = 1|V = v)× Pr(V = v)
Pr(Y a=0 = 1)
Bayes Theorem
=
Pr(Y a=0 = 1|A = 0, V = v)× Pr(V = v)
Pr(Y a=0 = 1)
Exchangeability
=
Pr(Y = 1|A = 0, V = v)× Pr(V = v)
Pr(Y a=0 = 1)
Consistency
(3)
Pr(Y a=0 = 1) is constant over v and can therefore be factored out of the weights. In
the absence of confounding, the weights Pr(V = v|Y a=0 = 1) are therefore equivalent to
Miettinen’s weights Pr(V = v)× Pr(Y = 1|A = 0, V = v) as discussed earlier.
An alternative identification of the weights can be used if standardizing experimental
results to a population where everyone is unexposed. In such situations, Y a=0 = Y in
all individuals by consistency, and the weights in the target population are identified as
Pr(V = v|Y = 1)
5. DISCUSSION
We have reviewed well-established results from previous work on the collapsibility of
measures of association, and shown corresponding results for causal measures of effect.
With these causal effect measures, one is able to disentangle the components of non-
collapsibility that are due to the mathematical properties of the effect measure from
the components that are due to structural bias and the probabilistic structure of the
dataset. We have provided new, simple weights for the causal risk ratio, which guarantee
collapsibility over arbitrary baseline covariates, and showed that such weights do not exist
for the causal odds ratio.
Our weights for the risk ratio RR(−) are equivalent to the weights previously discussed
by Miettinen when there is no unmeasured confounding; in other words, in all situations
where standardizing over V provides a valid estimate of the causal effect. However, our
formulation allows much simpler presentation of the weights and of the proofs. Further-
more, our formulation highlights pitfalls of using weighted averages: When conditioning
on V, the correct weights cannot be estimated from the data if unmeasured confounding
is present. In such scenarios, using erroneous weights may amplify the bias that is caused
by unmeasured confounding within the strata.
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Finally, we note that in many cases it is possible to sidestep the collapsibility of the
effect measure entirely, by standardizing the distributions of Y a=1 and Y a=0 separately.
One way to do this is by reporting the overall marginal risk ratio RR(−) as
∑
v Pr(Y
a=1 = 1|V = v)× Pr(V = v)
∑
v Pr(Y
a=0 = 1|V = v)× Pr(V = v)
Since this procedure does not depend on non-collapsibility, analogous procedures are valid
for any effect measure, including the odds ratio.
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